references/capability-matrix.md
GitHubLinux Process Injection Capability Matrix
Use this file for feasibility checks. Live-process methods modify an existing image; launch-time methods affect a new image during controlled execve.
Overview
| Technique | Scope | Provides | Key constraints |
|---|---|---|---|
ptrace |
Existing image | Memory and register access; per-thread control | PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS; dumpability, capabilities, LSM/Yama; usually requires ptrace-stops |
/proc/<pid>/mem |
Existing image | Remote memory access | Open uses PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS; no implicit stop; non-writable VMA access depends on proc-mem policy |
process_vm_writev |
Existing image | Writes to writable remote memory | PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS; no register or stop control; partial and non-atomic writes |
LD_PRELOAD |
Controlled launch or execve |
Loader maps a shared object | Requires a compatible dynamic loader; static targets, secure execution, or sanitization can block it |
| Seccomp user notification | Supervised launch | Mediates selected syscalls and can inject FDs | Child must install a listener before execve; requires supported seccomp operations and controlled launch |
Live-Process Primitive Coverage
| Primitive | ptrace |
/proc/<pid>/mem |
process_vm_writev |
|---|---|---|---|
| Write writable memory | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Write RX memory | Generally | Policy-dependent | No |
| Modify saved PC/IP | Yes | No | No |
| Overwrite current instruction | Yes | Policy-dependent | Only in writable executable memory |
| Stack or ROP hijack | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| GOT or function-pointer hijack | Yes | Yes if writable; otherwise policy-dependent | Only if writable |
| Stop thread or write registers | Yes | No | No |
A Yes means the primitive is available, not that staging, synchronization, execution transfer, or recovery is solved.
Launch-Time Comparison
| Property | Traditional LD_PRELOAD |
seccomp-notify |
|---|---|---|
| Setup | Supply a shared object through a controlled preload request | Launch a child, install a listener, pass it to the supervisor, then execve |
| Trigger | Loader maps and initializes the object | Loader calls filtered openat/openat2; supervisor supplies an FD with SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD |
| Main requirements | Dynamic target, compatible ABI and loader, honored preload configuration | Controlled launch, dynamic target for this PoC, filter-install permission, supported notification ioctls |
| Kernel dependency | No dedicated injection API | User notification: 5.0; ADDFD: 5.9; SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SEND: 5.14 |
| Privilege effect | Runs in the launched program's resulting security context | Does not cross the target's UID, namespace, or LSM boundaries |
| Cleanup | Remove preload configuration and manage library side effects | Manage staged FDs and the seccomp filter that survives execve |
The PoC's memfd, loader-open substitution, and IFUNC resolver are implementation choices, not universal seccomp-notify requirements.
Key Caveats
- All live methods use the ptrace access algorithm.
ptraceandprocess_vm_writevuse real credentials;/proc/<pid>/memuses filesystem credentials. - Yama may add restrictions: scope
0adds none,1usually requires ancestry orPR_SET_PTRACER,2requiresCAP_SYS_PTRACE, and3denies attach-gated access. - Full RELRO blocks writable-only GOT modification.
ptracecan generally write ordinary private mappings despite page protections;/proc/<pid>/memdepends on proc-mem override policy. - Linux has no direct equivalents of
VirtualAllocEx,VirtualProtectEx, orCreateRemoteThread; induce allocation, permission changes, or thread creation inside the target. - ASLR, PIE, CET/shadow stacks, CFI, PAC, calling conventions, syscall restart behavior, and instruction-cache rules are platform-specific.
- Installing a seccomp listener without
CAP_SYS_ADMINin the relevant user namespace normally requiresPR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS. Validate notification IDs before acting on target state.