references/owasp-os-command-injection.md

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OWASP OS Command Injection Defense

Use this reference when reviewing shell execution, process spawning, CLI wrappers, build scripts, or utilities that pass attacker-controlled values to system commands.

Review Checks

  • Prefer language/library APIs over OS commands.
  • When commands are unavoidable, keep the executable fixed and pass arguments as a structured array.
  • Validate commands and arguments with allowlists and bounded formats.
  • Check for argument injection even when shell metacharacters are escaped.
  • Use end-of-options markers such as -- where supported.
  • Verify the process runs with the lowest privileges needed.

Pattern Examples

String-built shell command

// Vulnerable
exec("convert " + req.body.filename + " output.png");
// Safer
const input = validateBasename(req.body.filename);
spawn("convert", ["--", input, "output.png"], { shell: false });

Command selection from user input

# Vulnerable
subprocess.run([request.json["tool"], request.json["target"]])
tool = request.json["tool"]
if tool not in {"ping", "traceroute"}:
    raise BadRequest("unsupported tool")
target = validate_hostname(request.json["target"])
subprocess.run([tool, "--", target], check=True)

Escaped but still injectable argument

// Still risky: user can inject another curl option.
system("curl " . escapeshellarg($url));
// Better: fix command options and separate the operand.
system("curl -- " . escapeshellarg($url));

Review Prompts

  • Can a library API replace the command entirely?
  • Is the attacker choosing the executable, flags, working directory, or environment?
  • Can a value beginning with - become an unintended option?
  • Does the process inherit privileged environment variables or filesystem access?

Source

Local summary based on the OWASP OS Command Injection Defense Cheat Sheet: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/OS_Command_Injection_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html