references/attack-path-facts.md

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Attack Path Facts Guidance

Use this guidance during attack-path analysis before severity calibration.

Attack Path Facts

The attack-path facts should be gathered in structured form during analysis, but the final report should render them as markdown under a section such as ### Attack Path Facts or a similarly clear heading.

That rendered facts section should explicitly cover:

  • Assumptions
  • Context:
    • whether the impact is self-only or crosses a meaningful boundary
    • the repository evidence for that conclusion
  • In-Scope Status According to the Threat Model:
    • whether the component is in scope
    • the reasoning
  • Exposure:
    • whether the surface is public
    • ports, ingress, and load-balancer type when repository evidence exists
    • the evidence
  • Identity:
    • service account or managed identity if present
    • effective privileges
  • Cross-Boundary Behavior:
    • whether a boundary crossing is actually verified
    • the evidence chain
  • Vector:
    • remote, local_network, localhost, none, or unknown
    • the evidence
  • Preconditions:
    • what the attacker needs
    • whether those preconditions are plausible, unlikely, unachievable, or unknown
    • the evidence
  • Attacker Input Control:
    • whether attacker control is yes, plausible, no, or unknown
    • the evidence
  • Category
  • Mitigations Already Present
  • Auth Scope:
    • whether the path is public, internal-only, admin-only, or unknown
    • the evidence
  • Impact Surface:
    • build, runtime, data, identity, network, or other
    • the evidence
  • Target Reach:
    • single service, base image, fleet, or unknown
    • the evidence
  • Secrets References:
    • the secret type and reference chain when present
  • Counterevidence:
    • the strongest conflicting repository evidence for the reportability-driving facts
    • why that evidence is or is not dispositive
  • Blindspots
  • Controls
  • Confidence

Prefer turning those facts into readable bullets or short labeled paragraphs instead of exposing a raw schema dump. The final report should make the scoping and reportability facts easy to inspect, including:

  • whether the finding is in scope according to the threat model
  • whether the surface is public, internal, admin-only, localhost-only, or unknown
  • what attacker-controlled input exists
  • what preconditions the attacker needs and whether they are achievable
  • whether a real trust boundary is crossed
  • what identities, privileges, or secrets are involved
  • what mitigations and controls already exist
  • what the strongest repository counterevidence is
  • what blindspots or residual uncertainty remain

Also make sure the rendered report carries forward:

  • the factual attack path as numbered attacker steps
  • the reachability and scoping logic
  • the strongest conflicting repository evidence
  • the final policy decision after suppression
  • the reasoning behind impact and likelihood