examples/sample-report.md
GitHubXSS Security Audit Report
Fictional example: This report demonstrates formatting and classification only. It is not the result of a real audit, and no reproduction steps were executed.
Date: Not applicable — fictional example
Audited by: Security Auditor
Scope: Fictional example-react-app; src/ only
Exclusions / Unread Files: All paths outside this example; no real repository was scanned
Analysis Type: Static analysis; no dynamic verification performed
Executive Summary
- Total locations examined: 1
- High severity vulnerabilities: 1
- Medium severity vulnerabilities: 0
- Low severity issues: 0
- Requires manual review: 0
High Severity Vulnerabilities
1. Preview - Unsanitized URL Data in Raw HTML Rendering
File: src/components/Preview.tsx:8 (fictional path)
Description:
A URL query parameter is rendered through React's dangerouslySetInnerHTML without an HTML sanitization step. In this fictional code path, an attacker can supply markup that the browser parses as HTML.
Impact:
A victim who opens an attacker-crafted URL could execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the application's origin. A restrictive CSP could reduce impact, but no CSP assessment is included in this fictional example.
Data Flow:
window.location.search → URLSearchParams.get("html") → dangerouslySetInnerHTML
Source: The html URL query parameter.
Sink: React dangerouslySetInnerHTML on a div element.
Missing Validation: No context-appropriate HTML sanitizer is applied before the raw HTML sink.
Confidence: High for the illustrated static data flow.
Verification Status: Static data flow established; dynamic verification not performed.
Reproduction Notes: Theoretical only. A test payload could place an HTML element with an event handler in the html query parameter. This step was not executed and is not evidence against a real application.
Vulnerable Code:
const html = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search).get("html") ?? "";
return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: html }} />;
Fix / Recommendation:
Prefer rendering text instead of raw HTML. If rich HTML is required, sanitize the final HTML with a maintained, context-appropriate sanitizer and an explicit profile, then avoid unsafe transformations after sanitization. Review the effective sanitizer configuration and add CSP as defense-in-depth.
Medium/Low Severity Vulnerabilities
None in this fictional example.
Requires Manual Review
None in this fictional example.
Search Results Summary
Matches are review leads, not confirmed vulnerabilities. The single match below has a complete illustrated source-to-sink path.
| Layer | Focus | Matches Found | Vulnerabilities |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | DOM/HTML sinks | 1 | 1 |
| 2 | Attr/event sinks | 0 | 0 |
| 3 | URL/navigation & validation bypass | 0 | 0 |
| 4 | Config/content models & JSON-in-script | 0 | 0 |
| 5 | Props spreading/gadgets | 0 | 0 |
| 6 | Untrusted sources + postMessage sender | 0 | 0 |
| 7 | Prototype pollution | 0 | 0 |
| 8 | JS execution sinks | 0 | 0 |
| 9 | CSS/style sinks | 0 | 0 |
| 10 | SVG/XML | 0 | 0 |
| 11 | Markdown/pipelines & mXSS | 0 | 0 |
| 12 | Framework HTML rendering & trust hooks | 0 | 0 |
| 13 | Trusted Types & CSP | 0 | 0 |
| 14 | Framework attribute binding & client template injection | 0 | 0 |