references/breach-and-credentials.md

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Breach Data, Email-Pattern Inference, Email Harvest

Reference content for the offensive-osint skill. Originally §15 + §11 + §12 of the monolithic SKILL.md (refactored 2026-05-02 for size/load efficiency).

15. Breach & Leak Data

15.0.1 HudsonRock Cavalier — direct API recipe

The web UI wraps a public, unauthenticated JSON API. Hit it directly:

# By domain (canonical first call)
curl -sk -m 30 "https://cavalier.hudsonrock.com/api/json/v2/osint-tools/search-by-domain?domain=target.com" | jq .

# By email (single-account check)
curl -sk -m 30 "https://cavalier.hudsonrock.com/api/json/v2/osint-tools/search-by-email?email=alice@target.com" | jq .

# By URL (when target's app is the breach victim)
curl -sk -m 30 "https://cavalier.hudsonrock.com/api/json/v2/osint-tools/search-by-url?url=https://app.target.com" | jq .

PowerShell:

$hr = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://cavalier.hudsonrock.com/api/json/v2/osint-tools/search-by-domain?domain=$D" -TimeoutSec 30
"Employees: $($hr.employees) | Users: $($hr.users) | Third-party: $($hr.third_parties) | Total: $($hr.total)"
$hr.data.employees_urls | Sort-Object -Property occurrence -Descending | Select-Object -First 20
$hr.data.clients_urls   | Sort-Object -Property occurrence -Descending | Select-Object -First 15

Top-level JSON fields:

  • total — total stealer entries touching this domain.
  • totalStealers — global stealer-log corpus size (context only).
  • employees — count of <*>@<domain> accounts found.
  • users — count of accounts where the domain appeared as a visited URL (customers/vendors).
  • third_parties — accounts touching adjacent domains in the org.
  • data.employees_urls[] — {occurrence, type, url} — internal apps where employees were logging in when stolen. Subdomain hits here = recon gold.
  • data.clients_urls[] — same shape; user-facing apps (often reveals undocumented public portals).
  • data.stealer_families[] — {_key, _value} → which stealer (RedLine / Lumma / StealC / Vidar / Raccoon).
  • data.dates_compromised[] — {_key, _value} → temporal distribution.

Free-tier caveats (CRITICAL to know):

  • Subdomain hostnames in data.*_urls[] past the first few are redacted with asterisks (*****.target.com). Pivot to paid Cavalier tier or other sources for unredacted.
  • Free endpoint returns counts + sample URLs only. Cleartext passwords + emails are never in the free response.
  • Rate limit ~1 req/sec/IP; 429 on burst. Sleep 1s between calls.
  • For unredacted creds + bulk enumeration → paid Cavalier portal.

Severity mapping (per §15.1 + §15.2): employees ≥ 10 → CRITICAL, regardless of whether the breached service is still online (legacy Lotus Domino / on-prem mail decommissioned + cloud SSO migration → employees almost always reuse passwords → SSO_EXPOSURE escalates CRITICAL).

15.1 Domain-Level Breach Severity Mapping

When you query a breach corpus by domain, map the result to severity like so:

Stat Severity
≥ 10 employees compromised CRITICAL
1–9 employees compromised HIGH
≥ 1 end-user (non-employee) compromised MEDIUM
Domain seen in breach with 0 named accounts INFO

Employees vs end-users distinction: an employee account is <anything>@<target-domain> (the breach victim is the target's own staff). An end-user account is the target's customer who reused a password — useful for credential-stuffing risk awareness but not directly compromising the target's identity fabric.

15.2 SSO_EXPOSURE finding

When a discovered SSO tenant (Entra GUID / Okta slug / Google Workspace domain) intersects with the breach corpus on its domain → SSO_EXPOSURE finding, severity CRITICAL. Evidence: tenant ID + product + employee count + per-account source attribution.

Legacy-mail-decommissioned pattern (high-value variant):

If mail.<domain> / webmail.<domain> returns NXDOMAIN today but HudsonRock/HIBP corpus still has historical employee credentials against it AND autodiscover.<domain> resolves to Microsoft IPs (M365) or aspmx.l.google.com MX (Workspace), the org migrated from on-prem to cloud — and the stolen passwords almost certainly survived the migration via password reuse. Escalate to CRITICAL SSO_EXPOSURE even when the legacy host is dead.

Concrete triggers (all three together):

  1. Resolve-DnsName mail.<domain> -Type A → NXDOMAIN (legacy gone)
  2. HudsonRock corpus has employee URLs against the old host (e.g. mail.<domain>/names.nsf for Lotus Domino, mail.<domain>/owa/ for Exchange, mail.<domain>/iwaredir.nsf for iNotes, mail.<domain>/zimbra/ for Zimbra)
  3. Current MX → M365 / Google Workspace / Zoho cloud (DNS confirms migration)

Evidence pack: tenant GUID + breach count + 3+ legacy URLs from corpus + autodiscover Microsoft IPs + current MX. Recommend forced password rotation + MFA audit + Conditional Access review.


11. Email-Pattern Inference (TENTATIVE candidates)

Given a (first_name, last_name, domain), generate these 8 candidate addresses for breach pre-hits, phishing list curation, and downstream enrichment. Mark as TENTATIVE confidence until corroborated.

{first}.{last}@{domain}        # john.doe@example.com
{first}{last}@{domain}         # johndoe@example.com
{first}@{domain}               # john@example.com
{first[0]}{last}@{domain}      # jdoe@example.com
{first}.{last[0]}@{domain}     # john.d@example.com
{last}@{domain}                # doe@example.com
{first}_{last}@{domain}        # john_doe@example.com
{first}-{last}@{domain}        # john-doe@example.com

Lowercase before lookup. Strip diacritics for ASCII fallback. If the org uses a known pattern (e.g., Hunter.io shows {first}.{last} is dominant), prioritize that one and mark FIRM.


12. Email-Harvest Source Stack

Six parallel sources, dedup at the end:

  1. IntelX phonebook API — 2-step search + poll. Largest single source for breach-era addresses.
  2. Hunter.io — domain-search endpoint. ~25 free/month. Returns verified emails + roles.
  3. crt.sh — extract X.509 SAN extensions. Many certs include admin/contact emails.
  4. DuckDuckGo SERP scrape — HTML scrape of "@{target-domain}" results.
  5. Bing SERP scrape — same query, complementary index.
  6. Wayback CDX — historic snapshots of the target's homepage / contact / about pages often contain emails removed from the live site.

Email regex:

\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+\-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.\-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\b

Noise filter (reject numeric-only locals):

^[0-9]+$

(Discards garbage like 12345@example.com from random tokens.)