references/breach-and-credentials.md
GitHubBreach Data, Email-Pattern Inference, Email Harvest
Reference content for the
offensive-osintskill. Originally §15 + §11 + §12 of the monolithic SKILL.md (refactored 2026-05-02 for size/load efficiency).
15. Breach & Leak Data
- Have I Been Pwned — breach lookup; Pwned Passwords API (k-anonymity).
- Dehashed — credential search (paid).
- IntelX — data intelligence.
- LeakCheck, Snusbase, BreachDirectory, Scattered Secrets, Phonebook, LeakPeek.
- Cavalier (Hudson Rock) — infostealer log lookups; FREE; highest single-source ROI for finding compromised employee credentials in corporate SSO.
15.0.1 HudsonRock Cavalier — direct API recipe
The web UI wraps a public, unauthenticated JSON API. Hit it directly:
# By domain (canonical first call)
curl -sk -m 30 "https://cavalier.hudsonrock.com/api/json/v2/osint-tools/search-by-domain?domain=target.com" | jq .
# By email (single-account check)
curl -sk -m 30 "https://cavalier.hudsonrock.com/api/json/v2/osint-tools/search-by-email?email=alice@target.com" | jq .
# By URL (when target's app is the breach victim)
curl -sk -m 30 "https://cavalier.hudsonrock.com/api/json/v2/osint-tools/search-by-url?url=https://app.target.com" | jq .
PowerShell:
$hr = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://cavalier.hudsonrock.com/api/json/v2/osint-tools/search-by-domain?domain=$D" -TimeoutSec 30
"Employees: $($hr.employees) | Users: $($hr.users) | Third-party: $($hr.third_parties) | Total: $($hr.total)"
$hr.data.employees_urls | Sort-Object -Property occurrence -Descending | Select-Object -First 20
$hr.data.clients_urls | Sort-Object -Property occurrence -Descending | Select-Object -First 15
Top-level JSON fields:
total— total stealer entries touching this domain.totalStealers— global stealer-log corpus size (context only).employees— count of<*>@<domain>accounts found.users— count of accounts where the domain appeared as a visited URL (customers/vendors).third_parties— accounts touching adjacent domains in the org.data.employees_urls[]—{occurrence, type, url}— internal apps where employees were logging in when stolen. Subdomain hits here = recon gold.data.clients_urls[]— same shape; user-facing apps (often reveals undocumented public portals).data.stealer_families[]—{_key, _value}→ which stealer (RedLine / Lumma / StealC / Vidar / Raccoon).data.dates_compromised[]—{_key, _value}→ temporal distribution.
Free-tier caveats (CRITICAL to know):
- Subdomain hostnames in
data.*_urls[]past the first few are redacted with asterisks (*****.target.com). Pivot to paid Cavalier tier or other sources for unredacted. - Free endpoint returns counts + sample URLs only. Cleartext passwords + emails are never in the free response.
- Rate limit ~1 req/sec/IP; 429 on burst. Sleep 1s between calls.
- For unredacted creds + bulk enumeration → paid Cavalier portal.
Severity mapping (per §15.1 + §15.2): employees ≥ 10 → CRITICAL, regardless of whether the breached service is still online (legacy Lotus Domino / on-prem mail decommissioned + cloud SSO migration → employees almost always reuse passwords → SSO_EXPOSURE escalates CRITICAL).
15.1 Domain-Level Breach Severity Mapping
When you query a breach corpus by domain, map the result to severity like so:
| Stat | Severity |
|---|---|
| ≥ 10 employees compromised | CRITICAL |
| 1–9 employees compromised | HIGH |
| ≥ 1 end-user (non-employee) compromised | MEDIUM |
| Domain seen in breach with 0 named accounts | INFO |
Employees vs end-users distinction: an employee account is <anything>@<target-domain> (the breach victim is the target's own staff). An end-user account is the target's customer who reused a password — useful for credential-stuffing risk awareness but not directly compromising the target's identity fabric.
15.2 SSO_EXPOSURE finding
When a discovered SSO tenant (Entra GUID / Okta slug / Google Workspace domain) intersects with the breach corpus on its domain → SSO_EXPOSURE finding, severity CRITICAL. Evidence: tenant ID + product + employee count + per-account source attribution.
Legacy-mail-decommissioned pattern (high-value variant):
If mail.<domain> / webmail.<domain> returns NXDOMAIN today but HudsonRock/HIBP corpus still has historical employee credentials against it AND autodiscover.<domain> resolves to Microsoft IPs (M365) or aspmx.l.google.com MX (Workspace), the org migrated from on-prem to cloud — and the stolen passwords almost certainly survived the migration via password reuse. Escalate to CRITICAL SSO_EXPOSURE even when the legacy host is dead.
Concrete triggers (all three together):
Resolve-DnsName mail.<domain> -Type A→ NXDOMAIN (legacy gone)- HudsonRock corpus has employee URLs against the old host (e.g.
mail.<domain>/names.nsffor Lotus Domino,mail.<domain>/owa/for Exchange,mail.<domain>/iwaredir.nsffor iNotes,mail.<domain>/zimbra/for Zimbra) - Current MX → M365 / Google Workspace / Zoho cloud (DNS confirms migration)
Evidence pack: tenant GUID + breach count + 3+ legacy URLs from corpus + autodiscover Microsoft IPs + current MX. Recommend forced password rotation + MFA audit + Conditional Access review.
11. Email-Pattern Inference (TENTATIVE candidates)
Given a (first_name, last_name, domain), generate these 8 candidate addresses for breach pre-hits, phishing list curation, and downstream enrichment. Mark as TENTATIVE confidence until corroborated.
{first}.{last}@{domain} # john.doe@example.com
{first}{last}@{domain} # johndoe@example.com
{first}@{domain} # john@example.com
{first[0]}{last}@{domain} # jdoe@example.com
{first}.{last[0]}@{domain} # john.d@example.com
{last}@{domain} # doe@example.com
{first}_{last}@{domain} # john_doe@example.com
{first}-{last}@{domain} # john-doe@example.com
Lowercase before lookup. Strip diacritics for ASCII fallback. If the org uses a known pattern (e.g., Hunter.io shows {first}.{last} is dominant), prioritize that one and mark FIRM.
12. Email-Harvest Source Stack
Six parallel sources, dedup at the end:
- IntelX phonebook API — 2-step search + poll. Largest single source for breach-era addresses.
- Hunter.io — domain-search endpoint. ~25 free/month. Returns verified emails + roles.
- crt.sh — extract X.509 SAN extensions. Many certs include admin/contact emails.
- DuckDuckGo SERP scrape — HTML scrape of
"@{target-domain}"results. - Bing SERP scrape — same query, complementary index.
- Wayback CDX — historic snapshots of the target's homepage / contact / about pages often contain emails removed from the live site.
Email regex:
\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+\-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.\-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\b
Noise filter (reject numeric-only locals):
^[0-9]+$
(Discards garbage like 12345@example.com from random tokens.)