references/severity-matrix.md
GitHubSeverity Decision Matrix
Reference content for the
offensive-osintskill. Originally §40 of the monolithic SKILL.md (refactored 2026-05-02 for size/load efficiency).
40. Severity Decision Matrix — Worked Examples
When in doubt, anchor on these worked examples (drawn from real engagements):
| Finding | Severity | Why |
|---|---|---|
/.git/config reachable on prod webapp |
CRITICAL | Full source-code disclosure; secret history reconstructable. |
/.env reachable on prod webapp |
CRITICAL | Plaintext creds (DB, cloud, API). |
| Open Firebase RTDB returning data | CRITICAL | All app data readable; often writable. |
| Listable S3 bucket containing PII | CRITICAL | Direct data exfil. |
| Listable S3 bucket containing logs only | HIGH | Internal hostnames + paths in logs; pivot data. |
Spring Boot /actuator/env exposed |
CRITICAL | DB creds, JWT secrets, cloud keys in env. |
Spring Boot /actuator/heapdump exposed |
CRITICAL | Heap contains live secrets in string form. |
Open Elasticsearch (/_cat/indices returns) |
CRITICAL | Full data reads; often writable. |
| Open MongoDB (no auth) | CRITICAL | Full data + password-hash collection. |
| Open Redis (no AUTH) | CRITICAL | Write authorized_keys → SSH foothold. |
| Open Docker API (port 2375) | CRITICAL | Container/host takeover. |
| Public PMAK validated live with broad scope | CRITICAL | Full Postman account + all team workspaces. |
| Public AWS root access key validated live | CRITICAL | Full account compromise. |
| Live AWS IAM-user key found on GitHub | HIGH | Limited scope (depends on IAM policy); often elevatable. |
| Live GitHub PAT found in JS bundle | HIGH | Repo write access (depends on scope). |
| Live Slack token in pastebin | HIGH | Workspace data + history; sometimes channel post. |
Sourcemap (.js.map) accessible on prod |
HIGH | Frontend source disclosure. |
| Open GraphQL introspection on prod | HIGH | Full schema → mutations + business-logic discovery. |
| Subdomain takeover possible (Heroku / GitHub Pages / etc.) | HIGH | Takeover → phishing on trusted domain. |
Reflected CORS with credentials on /api/billing |
HIGH | CSRF-via-CORS for billing data. |
| Verb tampering: DELETE allowed on documented-GET-only endpoint | HIGH | Authz bypass; potentially destructive. |
phpinfo.php reachable on prod |
HIGH | Discloses paths, env vars, modules → vuln-version pivot. |
Tomcat /manager/html reachable |
HIGH | Often default creds; WAR upload = RCE. |
| Jenkins script console accessible | HIGH | Groovy script execution = RCE. |
Missing HSTS on /login |
HIGH (escalated from MED) | Login pages must enforce HSTS. |
| Missing HSTS on standard pages | MEDIUM | Hardening gap. |
| Missing CSP | MEDIUM | XSS impact mitigation gone. |
| Internal IP / K8s service DNS in JS | MEDIUM | Internal topology disclosure. |
Apache /server-status reachable |
MEDIUM | Live request visibility. |
android:debuggable=true on prod app |
CRITICAL | Production debug-build → full client compromise. |
android:allowBackup=true (no whitelist) |
MEDIUM | App data exfil via adb backup. |
android:usesCleartextTraffic=true |
MEDIUM | MITM-able on hostile networks. |
Sensitive deep-link handler (myapp://reset-password) |
HIGH | Other apps can trigger sensitive flows. |
| Exported Android component without permission | MEDIUM | IPC attack surface. |
| Slack webhook URL leaked | MEDIUM | Send to channel; can be used for social-eng. |
| Twilio Account SID leaked (no auth token) | MEDIUM | Half a credential pair; plus account enumeration. |
| Wildcard CORS on data-returning API | MEDIUM | Lower than reflected+creds but still exfil-able. |
Missing X-Frame-Options |
LOW | Clickjacking. |
.DS_Store exposed |
LOW | Directory listing of dev's machine. |
| Stripe test key leaked | LOW | No real money risk. |
| Firebase URL exposed (no open RTDB) | LOW | Project-ID disclosure only. |
| Cert pinning missing in mobile app | LOW | MITM possible on hostile networks. |
| Outdated WordPress install detected | LOW | Pending CVE confirmation. |
Missing Referrer-Policy / Permissions-Policy |
INFO | Hardening, not an exposure. |
/.well-known/security.txt discovered |
INFO | Useful contact info only. |
| Domain in breach with 0 named accounts | INFO | Contextual only. |
| Private bucket exists (HEAD 403) | INFO | Asset only, no finding. |
| Open kubelet on 10250 | CRITICAL | Pod exec without K8s API auth. |
| Open etcd on 2379 | CRITICAL | Cluster state + secrets. |
| K8s API on 6443 with anonymous-auth | HIGH | Cluster recon; sometimes pod exec. |
| K8s dashboard exposed without auth | HIGH | Cluster admin UI. |
| Helm Tiller (Helm 2) on 44134 | HIGH | Cluster-admin scope. |
| Citrix Netscaler with KEV CVE | CRITICAL | Patch immediately; actively exploited. |
| F5 BIG-IP TMUI accessible | HIGH | TMUI = admin panel; CVE-2022-1388 if unpatched = CRIT. |
| Pulse Secure with CVE-2024-21887 | CRITICAL | KEV; chained command injection. |
| FortiGate with CVE-2024-21762 | CRITICAL | KEV; auth bypass + RCE. |
| PaloAlto GlobalProtect with CVE-2024-3400 | CRITICAL | KEV; pre-auth RCE. |
| VMware vCenter with CVE-2021-21972 | CRITICAL | KEV; pre-auth RCE. |
| VMware ESXi exposed without VPN | HIGH | Multiple CVEs (ESXiArgs ransomware vector). |
| MS Exchange with ProxyShell/Logon/NotShell unpatched | CRITICAL | KEV chain; RCE + mailbox dump. |
| AWS Lambda Function URL accessible anonymously | HIGH | Direct invocation; check IAM auth posture. |
| Public Cloud Run / Cloud Function unauthenticated | HIGH | Same. |
| Public Docker registry (anonymous catalog) | MEDIUM | Image enum + secret hunt in layers. |
| GitHub Actions secrets echoed in workflow logs | HIGH | Secret-in-log = full secret disclosure. |
GitHub Actions pull_request_target checkout of fork code |
HIGH | Class of bug; secrets accessible to attacker PRs. |
| GitLab self-hosted with CVE-2021-22205 | CRITICAL | KEV; ExifTool RCE. |
Jenkins with pull_request_target-equivalent misconfig |
HIGH | Build secrets accessible to PRs. |
| Public Notion page with internal SOPs | MEDIUM | Operational intel; sometimes credentials. |
| Public Trello board with credentials in cards | HIGH | Often plaintext API keys. |
| Public Confluence space with onboarding docs | MEDIUM | Seed creds + tech-stack reveal. |
| Public Miro board with architecture diagrams | LOW | Internal-host disclosure. |
DMARC policy p=none on production sending domain |
MEDIUM | Spoof feasible (escalated from LOW for risk surface). |
SPF ~all (softfail) without strict DMARC |
MEDIUM | Spoofs land in spam, but land. |
| MX server allows open relay (test with 250 OK to RCPT TO foreign domain) | HIGH | Spam + spoof feasibility. |
| Live Anthropic / OpenAI API key with broad scope | CRITICAL | Quota cost + potential PII in past responses. |
Live npm token with publish scope |
CRITICAL | Supply-chain compromise of all maintained packages. |
| Live PyPI / Docker Hub / GHCR token with publish scope | CRITICAL | Supply-chain compromise. |
| Atlassian token with admin scope | HIGH | Workspace-wide read; sometimes write. |
| Subdomain takeover candidate confirmed | HIGH | Trusted-domain phishing surface. |
| Sensitive CI/CD wordlist hits (Jenkinsfile, .gitlab-ci.yml on public repo) | MEDIUM | Build-script intel; often references secret names. |
| Public Postman workspace with internal API endpoints | MEDIUM | API attack surface mapped. |
| WAF/CDN trivially bypassable (origin discoverable via §16.15) | HIGH | All WAF protections null. |
| TLS 1.0/1.1 supported on prod | MEDIUM | Compliance gap; PCI-DSS forbids TLS 1.0. |
| RC4 / 3DES cipher accepted | MEDIUM | NOMORE / SWEET32 attacks. |
| Cert about to expire (<30 days) | LOW | Operational risk; not exploitable. |
| Self-signed cert on prod | MEDIUM | Trust failure for users. |
| Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160) detected | CRITICAL | Memory disclosure including session tokens + keys. |
| Public Slack invite link discoverable | HIGH | Anyone joins workspace; full DM/channel access. |
| Vendor / supplier / e-procurement portal publicly exposed + breach corpus shows vendor accounts compromised | HIGH | Vendor impersonation + procurement fraud (BEC vector); regulatory exposure if PII/payment data flows. |
| Job-application / careers portal collects PII over plain HTTP (no TLS) | HIGH | Cleartext PII at scale; regulatory exposure under GDPR / CCPA / India DPDP Act / LGPD. |
| Decommissioned legacy mail (NXDOMAIN today) + breach corpus has historical employee URLs against it + cloud SSO migration confirmed via autodiscover IPs | CRITICAL | Stolen passwords almost certainly survived migration via reuse; SSO_EXPOSURE escalates regardless of the legacy host being dead. |
Public-facing intranet (intranet.<domain> resolves and returns content without VPN) |
MEDIUM | Internal-staff portal exposed; often leaks org structure, employee directory, internal apps. |
| Staging / preprod / UAT / sandbox subdomain publicly resolvable | MEDIUM | Often weaker auth, debug endpoints, test creds; sometimes mirrors prod data. |
vpn.<domain> resolves but vendor + version unknown (passive only) |
INFO | Attack surface flag only; escalate to HIGH-CRITICAL after active fingerprint matches a KEV CVE (§16.16). |
| DMARC RUA points to a third-party reporting vendor (kdmarc / dmarcian / Valimail / Agari / EasyDMARC) | INFO | Tenant signal only; vendor compromise = DMARC bypass for all their customers. |