references/sector-notes.md

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Sector-Specific Recon Notes

Reference content for the offensive-osint skill. Originally §47 of the monolithic SKILL.md (refactored 2026-05-02 for size/load efficiency).

47. Sector-Specific Recon Notes

Most recon generalizes; some sectors have unique attack-surface elements worth flagging.

47.1 Healthcare

  • DICOM (medical imaging) — port 11112, sometimes 4242 (testing).
  • HL7 v2 (clinical messaging) — port 2575 (TCP, often plaintext).
  • HL7 FHIR (modern REST API) — typically /fhir/R4/<resource> paths; OAuth / SMART-on-FHIR auth posture varies wildly.
  • PACS / RIS / EHR systems — Epic (*.epic.com SaaS), Cerner/Oracle Health, Allscripts/Veradigm, Athenahealth, NextGen, Meditech, eClinicalWorks. Each has known CVE history.
  • Searches: site:{domain} ("EHR" OR "PACS" OR "PHI" OR "HIPAA"), intitle:"Epic Systems" "{target}".
  • Severity escalation: any PHI exposure → CRITICAL (regulatory + reputational); HL7/DICOM open without auth → CRITICAL.

47.2 Finance

  • SWIFT terminals — typically internal-only; if external-facing, CRITICAL. Look for SWIFT Alliance Web Platform.
  • FIX protocol (electronic trading) — port 9876 (common); cleartext.
  • Bloomberg terminals — typically VDI; check for bloomberg.com-related auth surfaces.
  • Trading platform vendors — Fidessa, Charles River, Eze Software, Aladdin (BlackRock).
  • Banking middleware — Temenos T24, Finacle (Infosys), FIS, Jack Henry, Fiserv. Each has known CVE history.
  • Searches: site:{domain} ("PCI" OR "SOX" OR "GLBA" OR "MAS"), intitle:"Temenos" "{target}".
  • Severity escalation: any account/balance data exposure → CRITICAL; SWIFT exposure → CRITICAL; trade-execution surface exposure → CRITICAL.

47.3 ICS / SCADA / OT

Caution: ICS/SCADA assets often run on legacy systems where even passive scanning can cause disruption. Do not actively probe ICS without explicit RoE coverage and operator coordination with the OT team.

  • Modbus — port 502 (TCP).
  • BACnet — port 47808 (UDP).
  • Siemens S7 — port 102 (ISO-TSAP).
  • DNP3 — port 20000 (TCP).
  • EtherNet/IP — port 44818 (TCP).
  • Niagara Framework — port 1911, 4911, 5011, 502.
  • Honeywell EBI / Tridium — varies.
  • GE Proficy / iFIX — varies.
  • Common findings: unauthenticated read access (BACnet point list, Modbus register read), default credentials on HMI panels, public-facing engineering workstations.
  • Sources: Shodan ICS-specific filters (port:502, tag:ics), Censys, Onyphe.
  • Detectability: medium-to-high; ICS networks often have low background traffic and are heavily monitored.

47.4 IoT / Consumer / SOHO

  • MQTT — port 1883 (cleartext), 8883 (TLS). Topics often readable without auth.
  • CoAP — port 5683 (UDP).
  • UPnP / SSDP — port 1900 (UDP); often discloses internal device map.
  • Common router admin patterns: /cgi-bin/, /setup.cgi, /admin/index.html. Default creds are the norm.
  • Camera DVRs / NVRs — Hikvision, Dahua, Axis. Multiple CVEs.
  • Smart-home hubs — exposed APIs sometimes leak auth tokens.

47.5 Government

  • .gov and .mil domains require special engagement-scope discipline.
  • FedRAMP / FISMA / DoD CMMC — defensive posture is generally above baseline.
  • OSINT data sources: USAspending.gov, SAM.gov (System for Award Management), FBO.gov / sam.gov (procurement).
  • Common findings: vendor of record disclosed in public contracts → adjacent-vendor pivot.
  • Severity: as high or higher than commercial; political sensitivity layered on top of technical impact.

47.6 Maritime / Aviation / Auto

  • Maritime: AIS (Automatic Identification System) — vessel positions; tools MarineTraffic, VesselFinder. Engine telemetry sometimes exposed via VSAT.
  • Aviation: ADS-B (already covered §32.3); operator/airline-specific OPS data sometimes exposed.
  • Automotive: OEM telematics backends (Tesla, GM OnStar, etc.) — typically authenticated, but APIs leak via mobile-app reverse engineering.

47.7 Universal sector caveat

Most external recon techniques apply universally. Sector-specific protocols add attack surface; sector-specific compliance regimes add reporting requirements. Don't assume "healthcare/finance/etc. has different OSINT" — the OSINT is the same; the targeted services differ.