references/sector-notes.md
GitHubSector-Specific Recon Notes
Reference content for the
offensive-osintskill. Originally §47 of the monolithic SKILL.md (refactored 2026-05-02 for size/load efficiency).
47. Sector-Specific Recon Notes
Most recon generalizes; some sectors have unique attack-surface elements worth flagging.
47.1 Healthcare
- DICOM (medical imaging) — port 11112, sometimes 4242 (testing).
- HL7 v2 (clinical messaging) — port 2575 (TCP, often plaintext).
- HL7 FHIR (modern REST API) — typically
/fhir/R4/<resource>paths; OAuth / SMART-on-FHIR auth posture varies wildly. - PACS / RIS / EHR systems — Epic (
*.epic.comSaaS), Cerner/Oracle Health, Allscripts/Veradigm, Athenahealth, NextGen, Meditech, eClinicalWorks. Each has known CVE history. - Searches:
site:{domain} ("EHR" OR "PACS" OR "PHI" OR "HIPAA"),intitle:"Epic Systems" "{target}". - Severity escalation: any PHI exposure → CRITICAL (regulatory + reputational); HL7/DICOM open without auth → CRITICAL.
47.2 Finance
- SWIFT terminals — typically internal-only; if external-facing, CRITICAL. Look for SWIFT Alliance Web Platform.
- FIX protocol (electronic trading) — port 9876 (common); cleartext.
- Bloomberg terminals — typically VDI; check for
bloomberg.com-related auth surfaces. - Trading platform vendors — Fidessa, Charles River, Eze Software, Aladdin (BlackRock).
- Banking middleware — Temenos T24, Finacle (Infosys), FIS, Jack Henry, Fiserv. Each has known CVE history.
- Searches:
site:{domain} ("PCI" OR "SOX" OR "GLBA" OR "MAS"),intitle:"Temenos" "{target}". - Severity escalation: any account/balance data exposure → CRITICAL; SWIFT exposure → CRITICAL; trade-execution surface exposure → CRITICAL.
47.3 ICS / SCADA / OT
Caution: ICS/SCADA assets often run on legacy systems where even passive scanning can cause disruption. Do not actively probe ICS without explicit RoE coverage and operator coordination with the OT team.
- Modbus — port 502 (TCP).
- BACnet — port 47808 (UDP).
- Siemens S7 — port 102 (ISO-TSAP).
- DNP3 — port 20000 (TCP).
- EtherNet/IP — port 44818 (TCP).
- Niagara Framework — port 1911, 4911, 5011, 502.
- Honeywell EBI / Tridium — varies.
- GE Proficy / iFIX — varies.
- Common findings: unauthenticated read access (BACnet point list, Modbus register read), default credentials on HMI panels, public-facing engineering workstations.
- Sources: Shodan ICS-specific filters (
port:502,tag:ics), Censys, Onyphe. - Detectability: medium-to-high; ICS networks often have low background traffic and are heavily monitored.
47.4 IoT / Consumer / SOHO
- MQTT — port 1883 (cleartext), 8883 (TLS). Topics often readable without auth.
- CoAP — port 5683 (UDP).
- UPnP / SSDP — port 1900 (UDP); often discloses internal device map.
- Common router admin patterns:
/cgi-bin/,/setup.cgi,/admin/index.html. Default creds are the norm. - Camera DVRs / NVRs — Hikvision, Dahua, Axis. Multiple CVEs.
- Smart-home hubs — exposed APIs sometimes leak auth tokens.
47.5 Government
.govand.mildomains require special engagement-scope discipline.- FedRAMP / FISMA / DoD CMMC — defensive posture is generally above baseline.
- OSINT data sources: USAspending.gov, SAM.gov (System for Award Management), FBO.gov / sam.gov (procurement).
- Common findings: vendor of record disclosed in public contracts → adjacent-vendor pivot.
- Severity: as high or higher than commercial; political sensitivity layered on top of technical impact.
47.6 Maritime / Aviation / Auto
- Maritime: AIS (Automatic Identification System) — vessel positions; tools MarineTraffic, VesselFinder. Engine telemetry sometimes exposed via VSAT.
- Aviation: ADS-B (already covered §32.3); operator/airline-specific OPS data sometimes exposed.
- Automotive: OEM telematics backends (Tesla, GM OnStar, etc.) — typically authenticated, but APIs leak via mobile-app reverse engineering.
47.7 Universal sector caveat
Most external recon techniques apply universally. Sector-specific protocols add attack surface; sector-specific compliance regimes add reporting requirements. Don't assume "healthcare/finance/etc. has different OSINT" — the OSINT is the same; the targeted services differ.