references/saas-public-surfaces.md
GitHubPublic SaaS Collaboration Surfaces
Reference content for the
offensive-osintskill. Originally §24 + §25 + §26 of the monolithic SKILL.md (refactored 2026-05-02 for size/load efficiency).
24. Postman Public Workspace Universal Search
Postman's public-search endpoint is unauthenticated and indexes every workspace marked public.
Verified endpoint shape (mid-2025 onward):
curl -sk -m 15 \
"https://www.postman.com/_api/ws/proxy" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'X-Entity-Team-Id: 0' \
-d '{
"service":"search",
"method":"POST",
"path":"/search-all",
"body":{
"queryIndices":["collaboration.workspace","runtime.collection","runtime.request"],
"queryText":"acme.com",
"size":100,
"from":0,
"clientTraceId":"",
"queryAllIndices":false,
"domain":"public"
}
}' | jq '.data[]'
This proxies through Postman's web app to their internal search service. Pagination via from (0, 100, 200, ...).
If the proxy shape changes (it has historically): inspect a real search request from the Postman web UI:
- Open
https://www.postman.com/explorein a browser. - Open DevTools → Network tab.
- Search for any term.
- Find the request to
_api/...— copy as cURL — adapt.
Per-workspace walk:
For each matching workspace ID:
WS_ID="<workspace-id>"
# Workspace metadata (name, description, team, visibility)
curl -sk -m 10 "https://www.postman.com/_api/workspace/$WS_ID" | jq .
# List collections + environments + monitors in workspace
curl -sk -m 10 "https://www.postman.com/_api/workspace/$WS_ID/collection" | jq '.[].id'
curl -sk -m 10 "https://www.postman.com/_api/workspace/$WS_ID/environment" | jq '.[].id'
# Per-collection: full content (requests, headers, scripts, env vars)
COL_ID="<collection-id>"
curl -sk -m 10 "https://www.postman.com/_api/collection/$COL_ID" | jq '.collection.item[]'
Ownership scoring signals:
- Creator/team name mentions target domain or brand → strong.
- Workspace name/description mentions target → strong.
- Request URLs contain
*.target.com→ strongest signal (workspace is actively used against target's APIs).
Run secret catalog (§17) over every text blob extracted from the requests, env vars, pre-request scripts, and test scripts.
25. Stack Exchange OSINT Sweep
Stack Exchange and its sister sites collect code paste-ins from developers — many include secrets, internal hostnames, and proprietary code excerpts.
Sites to query (8 with highest signal):
stackoverflow.com
serverfault.com
dba.stackexchange.com
devops.stackexchange.com
security.stackexchange.com
superuser.com
sharepoint.stackexchange.com
salesforce.stackexchange.com
API:
GET https://api.stackexchange.com/2.3/search/advanced
?site=<site>
&q=<target>
&filter=withbody
&pagesize=100
Code block extraction regex:
<pre><code>([\s\S]*?)</code></pre>
(Stack Exchange wraps code in <pre><code> HTML.)
Pipeline:
- Search each site for the target name, brand, root domain.
- Extract code blocks from
bodyHTML. - Run secret catalog (§17) over each block.
- Cross-reference post author email (where exposed in profile) against email_osint discoveries — confirms employee posting target's internal code.
- Extract hostnames from code blocks → upsert as
subdomainassets.
Quota: Stack Exchange API permits 30 requests/day without a key; with a free key, 10,000/day. Throttle with 2-second min interval per call.
26. Public SaaS Collaboration Surfaces
Many SaaS collaboration tools allow public sharing. Dork them like search engines.
Platforms with high incident rate:
trello.com
notion.so / notion.site
*.atlassian.net (Jira / Confluence)
miro.com
asana.com
clickup.com
airtable.com
Dork template:
site:{platform} "{target-keyword}"
Run via search-engine adapter (DDG default; Bing / Brave / Yandex / SerpAPI optional). The same classification logic from §18.7 applies.
Common findings:
- Public Trello board with credentials in card titles or attached config files.
- Public Notion page with internal SOPs, API keys in code blocks, customer data.
- Public Confluence space with onboarding docs containing seed creds.
- Public Miro board with architecture diagrams revealing internal hostnames.